We prove game-theoretic generalizations of some well known zero-one laws. Our proofs make the martingales behind the laws explicit.
Hewitt and Savage's zero-one law: In an infinite sequence of independent and identically distributed trials, a permutable event has either probability zero or probability one. This was first proven by Hewitt and Savage, in 1955 ([2] , Theorem 11.3).
As one would expect from previous literature (cf. the bibliographical notes to Chapter 8 of [1] ), our argument for the ergodicity of Bernoulli and Markov shifts is similar to but simpler than our argument for Kolmogorov's zero-one law. In the case of Hewitt and Savage's zero-one law, we provide a martingale proof only for a special case; for us it is an open question whether this proof can be extended to the general case. In order to make the martingale nature of our reasoning clear, and in order to emphasize its generality, we formulate our proofs in the game-theoretic framework introduced by Shafer and Vovk in 2001 [4] . Whereas the usual framework for probability begins with a probability measure that determines prices (expected values) for all measurable and bounded payoffs, the game-theoretic framework begins directly with prices. As soon as prices are given, we have martingales: a martingale is the capital process resulting from a strategy for gambling at the given prices. As soon as we have martingales, we can prove theorems by constructing strategies. For example, we can prove that an event has probability one by constructing a strategy that multiplies the capital it risks by an infinite factor if the event fails.
If enough prices are given to determine a probability measure, then each measurable event will have a probability, and the capital process for a gambling strategy will be a martingale in the measure-theoretic sense. But when a proof relies purely on martingale reasoning, the assumption that there are enough prices to determine a probability measure is unnecessary. So we do not assume that the events we consider have probabilities.
As we will see, even a limited number of prices will determine for each subset of the sample space E a lower probability P(E) and an upper probability P(E) satisfying 0 ≤ P(E) ≤ P(E) ≤ 1 and P(E) = 1 − P (E c ) , where E c is the complement of E. (The latter equality will be our definition of lower probability.) We consider E certain if P(E) = 1 or, equivalently, P(E c ) = 0. In the special case where there are enough prices to determine a probability measure on a σ-algebra containing E, P(E) and P(E) will both equal the probability the measure gives to E.
In the usual theory, a zero-one law specifies a property of an event E that guarantees that either P(E) = 0 or P(E) = 1. The corresponding game-theoretic zero-one law might say that either P(E) = 0 or P(E) = 1. This does not assert that anything is certain or impossible, but it reduces to the usual law in the case where the prices determine a probability measure on a σ-algebra containing E, for then upper and lower probabilities are probabilities. Sometimes we will be able to prove a stronger statement, such as P(E) = 0 or P(E) = 1.
We will first lay out protocols for our games ( §2), define upper and lower probabilities in these protocols ( §3), and explain what a zero-one law looks like in terms of upper and lower probabilities ( §4). Then we give our martingale proofs: first for Kolmogorov's zero-one law for tail events in independently priced trials ( §5), for ergodicity in independently and identically priced trials and Markov trials ( §6), and finally for Hewitt and Savage's zero-one law for permutable events in independently and identically priced trials ( §7).
Protocols
In the protocols considered in this article, two players, whom we call Skeptic and Reality, play an infinite number of rounds, which we call trials. On each trial, Skeptic chooses a gamble and then Reality determines its payoff. Each player sees the other's moves as they are made. Reality sees Skeptic's move before determining its payoff, and Skeptic sees Reality's move before they go on to the next trial.
Formally, Skeptic chooses a real-valued function F on a set Ω, Reality then chooses an element ω of Ω, and Skeptic's payoff for the trial is F (ω). We call ω the outcome of the trial. We write K n for Skeptic's capital after the nth trial, and we assume that his initial capital is one monetary unit (K 0 = 1).
We assume that Skeptic chooses F from a non-empty set F of real-valued functions on Ω with these three properties:
2. If c ≥ 0 and F ∈ F, then cF ∈ F.
3. There is no F ∈ F such that F (ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω.
Property 2 guarantees that the function on Ω that is identically equal to 0 is in F . Properties 1 and 2 are the defining properties of a cone; we call property 3 coherence.
If P is a probability measure on a σ-algebra for Ω, then the set of all measurable real-valued functions on Ω that have expected value zero with respect to P is a coherent cone. Let us call it the zero cone for P . A coherent cone F on Ω may or may not be the zero cone for a probability measure. A number of coherent cones that are not zero cones are studied in [4] . Many of these cones are proper subsets of zero cones; in some cases, for example, they allow Skeptic to take only one side of a gamble F , inasmuch as F ∈ F but −F / ∈ F.
Remark. Our discussion could also be couched in terms of the nonpositive cone for P , consisting of the measurable real-valued functions on Ω with a nonpositive expected value with respect to P .
We consider three different protocols, which differ only in how F may change from one trial to the next. In the first protocol, F is always the same. In the special case where F is the zero cone for a probability measure P , this is a protocol for betting on successive outcomes drawn independently from P .
Protocol 1. Identically priced trials
Parameters: set Ω; coherent cone F of real-valued functions on Ω Protocol:
Skeptic announces F n ∈ F. Reality announces ω n ∈ Ω.
In the second protocol, the cone from which Skeptic selects his move may change from trial to trial, but the cone F n for the nth trial is fixed at the beginning of the game; it does not depend on outcomes of previous trials. In the special case where F n is the zero cone for a probability measure P n on Ω, this is a protocol for betting on outcomes that are drawn independently from the P n .
Protocol 2. Independently priced trials
Parameters: set Ω; coherent cones F 1 , F 2 , . . . of real-valued functions on Ω Protocol:
Skeptic announces F n ∈ F n . Reality announces ω n ∈ Ω.
In the third protocol, the cone for the nth trial may depend on the outcome ω n−1 of the preceding trial. To indicate this possible dependence, we designate the cone by F (ω n−1 ). In the special case where F (ω) is always a zero cone for a probability measure on Ω, this is a protocol for betting on the successive outcomes of a homogeneous Markov chain on Ω that starts at ω 0 .
Protocol 3. Markov trials
Parameters: set Ω; for each ω ∈ Ω, a coherent cone F (ω) of real-valued functions on Ω Protocol: Reality announces ω 0 ∈ Ω.
Skeptic announces F n ∈ F(ω n−1 ). Reality announces ω n ∈ Ω.
Events and upper and lower probabilities
Upper and lower probabilities can be defined for any of the protocols used in game-theoretic probability [4, 6] . We now review the definitions assuming, for simplicity, that we are using either Protocol 1 or Protocol 2, where the cone F n from which Skeptic chooses on each trial is fixed, independently of how Reality moves earlier in the game.
We call the set Ω ∞ of all infinite sequences of outcomes the sample space. We write ω 1 ω 2 . . . for a generic element of Ω ∞ , and we write ω 1 . . . ω n for a finite sequence of outcomes.
As we will see in this section, upper and lower probabilities are defined for any subset E of the sample space Ω ∞ . Accordingly, we call any subset of Ω ∞ an event. This diverges from standard terminology, in which only elements of a specified σ-algebra are called events. Our definitions of tail event ( §5), invariant event ( §6), and permutable event ( §7) will also make no reference to any σ-algebra.
A strategy for Skeptic specifies his moves F 1 , F 2 , . . . as functions of the preceding moves by Reality: F n is a function of ω 1 . . . ω n−1 . Once we fix such a strategy, Skeptic's capital process K 0 , K 1 , K 2 , . . . depends on Reality's moves alone: K 0 remains the constant 1, and K n is a function of ω 1 . . . ω n .
We call a strategy for Skeptic prudent if its capital process is everywhere nonnegative-i.e., if
∞ and all n.
In this case, the strategy risks only the initial unit capital. A strategy for Skeptic will satisfy lim sup
if and only if it is prudent. If the strategy is not prudent-i.e., if K n (ω 1 , . . . ω n ) < 0 for some ω 1 ω 2 . . . and some n, then Reality can violate (1) by making Skeptic's subsequent payoffs nonpositive, which is possible because of the coherence of the cones from which Skeptic selects his moves. The lim sup n→∞ in (1) can be replaced by lim inf n→∞ or by inf n . In our protocols, for any given event E and any c > 0, Skeptic has a prudent strategy that satisfies lim inf
if and only if he has a prudent strategy that satisfies sup n=1,2,...
This is because Skeptic can stop betting (choose F n = 0) once his capital reaches a given level.
For each event E, we set P(E) := inf ǫ > 0 | Skeptic has a prudent strategy for which sup n=1,2,...
and we set P(E) := 1 − P (E c ) .
We call P(E) the upper probability of E, and we call P(E) the lower probability of E.
Proof. The relation P(E) ≤ 1 follows from the fact that Skeptic can choose F n = 0 for all n, and 0 ≤ P(E) then follows by the definition (3). Suppose P(E) > P(E), i.e., P(E) + P(E c ) < 1. Then there exist ǫ 1 > 0, ǫ 2 > 0, and prudent strategies S 1 and S 2 for Skeptic such that ǫ 1 + ǫ 2 < 1, S 1 guarantees sup n K n ≥ I E /ǫ 1 , and S 2 guarantees sup n K n ≥ I E c /ǫ 2 , where I E is the indicator function of E, i.e., I E : Ω ∞ → R takes the value 1 on E and the value 0 outside E. Then (
But this is impossible since, by coherence, Reality can choose ω 1 ω 2 . . . so that
We can also consider capital processes determined by different strategies for Skeptic when his initial capital K 0 is not necessarily equal to 1. We call any such capital process a martingale. The martingales form a cone. We can rephrase our definition of upper probability, (2), by saying that P(E) is the infimum of all values of ǫ such that there exists a nonnegative martingale starting at ǫ and reaching at least 1 on every sequence ω 1 ω 2 . . . in E.
The preceding definitions are easily adapted to Protocol 3; we simply recognize that Skeptic's strategies and martingales will also depend on ω 0 as well as on ω 1 ω 2 . . . . These definitions also apply, with similarly minor modifications, to other protocols used in game-theoretic probability.
The following terminology spells out the intuitive meaning of extreme values for upper and lower probabilities:
• When P(E) = 0, we say E is unsupported.
• When P(E) = 1, we say E is certain.
• When P(E) = 0, we say E is impossible.
• When P(E) = 1, we say E is fully plausible.
• When E is unsupported and fully plausible, we say it is fully uncertain.
When an event is certain, it is also fully plausible. When it is impossible, it is also unsupported. An event being unsupported is equivalent to its complement being fully plausible. An event being certain is equivalent to its complement being impossible. An event is fully uncertain if and only if its complement is fully uncertain.
As we remarked in §1, both P(E) and P(E) will coincide with E's probability when there are enough prices to determine a probability measure for a σ-algebra containing E; see [4] ( §8.2). In this case, E cannot be fully uncertain.
Two types of zero-one law
A measure-theoretic zero-one law says that an event E satisfying specified conditions is either impossible or certain: either P(E) = 0 or P(E) = 1. In the general game-theoretic case, where we have only upper and lower probabilities, we get one of the following weaker statements:
1. E is either fully plausible or unsupported (or both-i.e., fully uncertain).
2. E is certain, impossible, or fully uncertain.
Condition 2 is stronger than Condition 1, because certain implies fully plausible, and impossible implies unsupported.
When the prices determine a probability measure on a σ-algebra containing E, we have P(E) = P(E) = P(E), and both conditions then imply that P(E) = 1 or P(E) = 0.
Our game-theoretic versions of Kolmogorov's zero-one law and ergodicity will assert Condition 2, but our game-theoretic version of Hewitt and Savage's zero-one law (proven only in a special case) will assert only Condition 1.
Kolmogorov's zero-one law
Our game-theoretic version of Kolmogorov's zero-one law is a theorem about Protocol 2.
An event E in Protocol 2 is called a tail event if any sequence in Ω ∞ that agrees from some point onwards with a sequence in E is also in E-i.e., if ω 1 ω 2 . . . and ω ′ 1 ω ′ 2 . . . are either both in E or both not in E whenever ω n = ω ′ n except for a finite number of n. It follows immediately from this definition that E is a tail event if and only if its complement E c is a tail event.
Theorem 1. If E is a tail event in Protocol 2 (independently priced trials), then E is certain, impossible, or fully uncertain.
Skeptic chooses from F n on trial n in Protocol 2. Our proof of Theorem 1 will use the fact that we get another instantiation of Protocol 2 if we start on trial n + 1 for some n ≥ 1-i.e., if Skeptic chooses from F n+1 on the first trial, from F n+2 on the second trial, and so on. We call this the shifted protocol, as opposed to the original protocol. The two protocols, the original one and the shifted one, have the same events; in both, any subset of Ω ∞ is an event. Let P −n denote upper probability in the shifted protocol. (In particular, P −0 = P.) Given a strategy S for Skeptic in the shifted protocol, write S +n for the strategy in the original protocol that sets Skeptic's first n moves equal to 0 and then plays S.
We write θ for the shift operator, which deletes the first element from a sequence in Ω ∞ :
We write E −n for θ n E:
The next two lemmas relate upper probabilities in the original and shifted protocols.
Lemma 2. If E is an event in Protocol 2, then
Proof. Suppose c > 0, and suppose S is a prudent strategy in the shifted protocol that achieves sup k=1,2,...
Then S +n is evidently also prudent and achieves sup k=1,2,...
in the original protocol. Let S +n denote the set of strategies in the original protocol of the form S +n . It follows that the infimum in (2) over S +n coincides with P −n (E −n ). Since the set S +n is non-increasing in n, we are taking the infimum over a smaller set of strategies in (2) when n is larger. So P −n (E −n ) is non-decreasing in n.
Lemma 3. If E is a tail event in Protocol 2, then P(E)
Proof. Suppose c > 0, and suppose S is a prudent strategy in the original protocol that achieves sup k=1,2,...
Because E is a tail event, Reality can choose any sequence from Ω n as her first n moves without affecting whether E happens. By coherence, she can choose these n moves so that S makes no money for Skeptic on the n trials. Condition (4) tells us that the moves specified by S on the (n + 1)th and later trials guarantee that Skeptic can make up this loss and still get at least c when ω 1 ω 2 . . . ∈ E. In the shifted protocol, Skeptic has capital 1 at the beginning rather than the same or smaller capital resulting from the losses. So these moves still define a prudent strategy and guarantee that sup k=1,2,...
in the shifted protocol. This implies P −n (E −n ) ≤ P(E) and together with the previous lemma we obtain P −n (E −n ) = P(E).
Proof of Theorem 1. We will show that if a tail event is not fully plausible, then it is impossible. This suffices to prove the theorem, because if E is a tail event, then E c is also a tail event. If E is not fully uncertain, then either E or E c is not fully plausible, and if one of them is impossible, then E is either impossible or certain.
Suppose, then, that E is not fully plausible: P(E) < 1. Choose ǫ such that P(E) < ǫ < 1. Then there is a prudent strategy S for Skeptic that guarantees he will multiply his initial capital of 1 by 1/ǫ in a finite number of trials. Skeptic plays this strategy until his capital reaches at least 1/ǫ. Then he starts over, playing (1/ǫ)S in the shifted game starting at that point. This eventually again multiplies his capital by another factor of 1/ǫ or more. Continuing in this way, he can make his capital arbitrarily large while playing prudently. This demonstrates that P(E) = 0-i.e., that E is impossible.
We have just shown that when E is a tail event with P(E) < 1, Skeptic has a prudent strategy guaranteeing lim
This implies P(E) = 0, but in general it may be stronger. So we have proven a bit more than the theorem asserts. We have proven that a tail event is either strongly certain, strongly impossible, or fully uncertain, where an event is said to be strongly impossible if (5) holds and strongly certain if its complement is strongly impossible.
Here is an example of a fully uncertain tail event. Consider Protocol 2 where Ω is a linear space, Ω = {0}, and F n ≡ F is the set of linear functions on Ω. If Reality chooses the origin 0 ∈ Ω, then F (0) = 0 for all F ∈ F. On the other hand if Skeptic chooses F = 0, then there exists ω ∈ Ω such that F (ω) < 0. Therefore the protocol is coherent. Let E be the event that Reality chooses ω n = 0 except for a finite number of n. Clearly E is a tail event. Since 000 . . . ∈ E, P(E) = 1. Now consider E c , which is the event that ω n = 0 infinitely often. For each choice F ∈ F, Reality can choose ω = 0 such that F (ω) ≤ 0. So P(E c ) = 1. It is interesting to compare our martingale proof with Kolmogorov's measuretheoretic proof, given in an appendix to Grundbegriffe and reproduced in many textbooks. Kolmogorov shows that a tail event E is independent of itself, so that P(E) = P(E) 2 and therefore P(E) = 0 or P(E) = 1. The martingale proof paints a little larger picture. Having Skeptic start over just once after multiplying his capital by 1/ǫ suffices to show that P(E) 2 ≥ P(E), and this implies P(E) = 0 or P(E) = 1. But by having Skeptic start over again and again, we find that he can become infinitely rich if E happens-i.e., that E is strongly impossible.
Ergodicity
Now consider Protocol 1, where Skeptic always chooses from the same cone, and Protocol 3, where the cone may depend on Reality's previous move.
We call an event E in one of these protocols weakly invariant if θE = E −1 ⊆ E. If E is weakly invariant, then by induction E −n is non-increasing in n. In accordance with standard terminology (e.g., [5] , §V.2), we call an event E invariant if E = θ −1 E.
Lemma 4. E is invariant if and only if both E and E
c are weakly invariant.
Proof. If E is invariant, then E c is also invariant, because the inverse map commutes with complementation. Hence in this case both E and E c are weakly invariant.
Conversely suppose that θE ⊆ E and θE c ⊆ E c . The first inclusion is equivalent to E ⊆ θ −1 E and the second is equivalent to E c ⊆ θ −1 E c . Since the right-hand sides of the last two inclusions are disjoint, these inclusions are in fact equalities.
Theorem 2. If E is a weakly invariant event in Protocol 1 (identically priced trials) or Protocol 3 (Markov trials), then E is either impossible or fully plausible.
Proof. It suffices, as in the proof of Theorem 1, to show that P(E) < 1 implies P(E) = 0. The current proof is, however, significantly simpler than that of Theorem 1: no analogue of Lemma 3 is needed.
Let E be a weakly invariant event in Protocol 1 such that P(E) < ǫ < 1. Assume that Reality chooses a path in E. Skeptic plays a prudent strategy until his capital increases by a factor of 1/ǫ or more at some round n 1 . By the assumption of weak invariance, E −n1 ⊆ E. This implies that when he starts over, there will be another time n 2 > n 1 such that he multiplies his capital again by 1/ǫ or more. Continuing in this way, he can make his capital arbitrarily large while playing prudently.
In the case of Protocol 3, Skeptic's strategies and martingales depend on ω 0 as well as on ω 1 ω 2 . . ., and the definition of P(E), (2), becomes P(E) := inf ǫ > 0 | Skeptic has a prudent strategy for which sup n=1,2,...
Similarly, for each ω ∈ Ω we define P ω (E) := inf ǫ > 0 | Skeptic has a prudent strategy for which sup n=1,2,...
We have P(E) = sup ω∈Ω P ω (E). Suppose P(E) < ǫ < 1. For each ω ∈ Ω, consider the modified protocol in which Reality's first move is ω, and choose a prudent strategy S ω for Skeptic in this protocol that eventually multiplies the initial unit capital by 1/ǫ or more. Now we can proceed as before: Skeptic first plays S ω0 until the first n for which K n ≥ 1/ǫ, then plays a scaled up version of S ωn until his capital is again multiplied by 1/ǫ or more, etc.
In view of Lemma 4 we obtain the following corollary to Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. If E is an invariant event in Protocol 1 (identically priced trials) or Protocol 3 (Markov trials)
, then E is certain, impossible, or fully uncertain.
Hewitt and Savage's zero-one law
Let us again consider Protocol 1, where Skeptic always chooses from the same cone.
Let us call an event E in Protocol 1 permutable if for any sequence in E and any n > 1, any sequence obtained by permuting the first n terms of the sequence is also in E. Let us call E singly generated if it is equal to the set of sequences obtained by taking a single sequence and permuting finite initial subsequences in all possible ways.
We may conjecture that any permutable event in Protocol 1 is either fully plausible or unsupported. But we know a martingale proof for this result only in the case where the permutable event is singly generated.
Proposition 1. If E is a singly generated permutable event in Protocol 1 (identically priced trials), then E is either fully plausible or unsupported.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose E is neither fully plausible nor unsupported. Then we may choose ǫ < 1 such that P(E) < ǫ and P(E c ) < ǫ. Choose prudent strategies S and S ′ for Skeptic that multiply his capital by at least 1/ǫ on E and E c , respectively. As usual, we derive a contradiction by showing the existence of a prudent strategy for Skeptic that makes his capital tend to infinity if E happens (i.e., showing that E is strongly impossible and so unsupported). Let ω 1 ω 2 . . . be the sequence of outcomes actually chosen by Reality. The strategy begins by playing S until the capital exceeds 1/ǫ. This happens on some trial n 1 if ω 1 ω 2 . . . ∈ E. At this point, we ask whether the remaining sequence ω n1+1 ω n1+2 . . . is in E or E c . In the first case, the strategy plays a scaled up version of S; in the second it plays a scaled up version of S ′ . Again, the capital will eventually be multiplied by 1/ǫ on some trial n 2 . Etc.
In conclusion, let us check that the initial sequence ω 1 . . . ω n (where n ∈ {n 1 , n 2 , . . .}) indeed determines whether the remaining sequence ω n+1 ω n+2 . . . Here is an example showing that the conclusion of Proposition 1 cannot be strengthened to say that E is impossible or fully plausible; in particular, to say that E is certain, impossible, or fully uncertain. Let Ω := {−1, 0, 1}, let F consist of functions F taking values −t, 0, t at −1, 0, 1, respectively, for some t ≥ 0, and let E be the set of all sequences in Ω ∞ that do not contain −1 and contain precisely one 1. Then E is permutable and singly generated; it is generated by the sequence 100 . . . . Reality can keep Skeptic from making any money by choosing the sequence 000 . . ., and since this sequence is in E c , this implies that P(E c ) = 1 and P(E) = 0. This is consistent with the conclusion of the proposition: E is unsupported. But the prudent strategy that does best for Skeptic on E is one that chooses t = 1 at the first trial and continues with this choice so long as Reality plays 0; this doubles Skeptic's money on E but no more, and so P(E) = 1/2. Thus E is neither impossible nor fully possible.
It would be interesting to extend Proposition 1 to all permutable events or construct a permutable event E for which 0 < P(E) ≤ P(E) < 1.
